轉自：新世紀，文章內容並不代表本網立場和觀點。
財經會議圈 2022-02-27
作者 l 基辛格（Henry Kissinger）
翻譯 l 洪灝轉載來源 | 長平經研
關於烏克蘭的公開討論都是關於對抗的。然而，我們知道路向何方嗎？在我的一生中，我看到的四場戰爭，都以極大的熱情和公眾的支持開始。我們並不知道如何結束所有這些戰爭，我們單方面撤出了其中三場戰爭。對政策的考驗，是它如何結束，而不是如何開始。
烏克蘭問題常常是一種攤牌的姿態：烏克蘭是加入東方，還是西方？但是，如果烏克蘭要生存和繁榮，它絕不能成為任何一方對抗另一方的前哨——它應該充當它們之間的橋樑。
俄羅斯必須承認，試圖迫使烏克蘭進入衛星國地位，從而再次移動俄羅斯的邊界，將使莫斯科註定要重蹈覆轍，進入與歐美相互施壓、自我實現的死循環。
西方必須明白，對俄羅斯而言，烏克蘭永遠不可能只是一個外國。俄國歷史開始於被稱為基輔羅斯的地方，俄羅斯宗教從那裡傳播開來。幾個世紀以來，烏克蘭一直是俄羅斯的一部分，在此之前，它們的歷史就交織在一起。從 1709 年的波爾塔瓦戰役開始，俄羅斯爭取自由的一些最重要的戰役，都是在烏克蘭領土上進行的。
黑海艦隊——俄羅斯在地中海地區投射力量的手段——在克里米亞塞瓦斯托波爾長期駐紮。即使像亞歷山大·索爾仁尼琴和約瑟夫·布羅茨基這樣著名的持不同政見者也堅持認為，烏克蘭是俄羅斯歷史的一個組成部分，事實上就是俄羅斯的一部分。
歐盟必須認識到，在烏克蘭與歐洲關係的談判中，歐盟官僚作風拖沓，戰略因素從屬於國內政治，導致談判演變成危機。外交政策是一門強調先後有別、輕重有分的藝術。
烏克蘭人是決定性因素。他們生活在一個歷史複雜、通曉多種語言的國家。1939 年，烏克蘭西線部分併入蘇聯，成為斯大林和希特勒瓜分的戰利品。克里米亞 60 %的人口是俄羅斯人，直到 1954 年，烏克蘭出生的尼基塔·赫魯曉夫在慶祝俄羅斯與哥薩克達成協議 300 周年之際，才將克里米亞納入烏克蘭版圖。烏克蘭西部大部分是天主教徒，而東部大部分則是俄羅斯東正教。
西烏克蘭人說烏克蘭語，而東烏克蘭人主要說俄語。烏克蘭的任何一方試圖支配另一方——這一直是一種慣用模式——將最終導致內戰或分裂。將烏克蘭視為東西方對抗的一部分，將使俄羅斯和西方——尤其是俄羅斯和歐洲進入一個合作性國際體系的前景在數十年內化為泡影。
烏克蘭獨立只有 23 年，從 14 世紀開始就一直處於某種外國統治之下。毫不奇怪，它的領導人沒有學會妥協的藝術，更不用說歷史的視角了。獨立后的烏克蘭政治清楚地表明，問題的根源在於烏克蘭政治家試圖將自己的意願強加于該國的頑抗地區，先是一派，然後是其對立派。
這是亞努科維奇和他的主要政治對手季莫申科之間衝突的實質。他們代表著烏克蘭的兩翼，並不願意分享權力。一個明智的美國對烏克蘭政策，是需要尋求一種讓烏克蘭的兩個部分相互合作的方式。我們應該尋求和解，而不是一個派別的統治。
俄羅斯和西方，尤其是烏克蘭的所有派別，都沒有按照這一原則行事。每一個派別都使情況變得更糟。在俄羅斯的許多邊界已經岌岌可危的時候，如果不統一自己，俄羅斯就無法強行實施軍事解決辦法。對西方來說，妖魔化普京不是一種政策，而是一種缺失的借口。
普京應該意識到，不管他有什麼不滿，軍事強加政策都會導致另一場冷戰。就美國而言，它需要避免把俄羅斯當作一個不正常的國家，耐心地接受華盛頓制定的行為準則。普京是一個嚴肅的戰略家——以俄羅斯歷史為前提。理解美國的價值觀和心理學不是他的強項。了解俄羅斯歷史和心理也不是美國決策者的強項。
各方領導人都應該重新審視結果，而不是在擺姿態方面相互競爭。以下是我對於符合各方價值觀和安全利益的結果的看法：
1）烏克蘭應有權自由選擇其經濟和政治聯盟，包括與歐洲的聯盟。
2）烏克蘭不應該加入北約( NATO )，這是我七年前提出的立場。
3）烏克蘭應自由建立符合其人民表達意願的任何政府。明智的烏克蘭領導人會選擇在他們國家不同地區之間實現和解的政策。實際上，他們應該追求一種堪比芬蘭的姿態。毫無疑問，這個國家非常獨立，在大多數領域都與西方合作，但卻小心翼翼地避免對俄羅斯的體制性敵意。
4）俄羅斯吞併克里米亞不符合現有世界秩序的規則。但在一個不那麼令人擔憂的基礎上處理克里米亞與烏克蘭的關係應該是可能的。為此，俄羅斯將承認烏克蘭對克里米亞的主權。在有國際觀察員在場的情況下舉行的選舉中，烏克蘭應該加強克里米亞的自治權。這一進程將包括消除有關塞瓦斯托波爾黑海艦隊地位的任何模糊不清之處。
這些只是原則，不是藥方。熟悉這一地區的人都知道，並非所有這些舉措都能讓各方滿意。關鍵不在於各方絕對的滿意，而是平衡不滿意的各方。如果不能實現基於這些或類似條件的某種解決方案，烏克蘭局勢就會加速走向對抗。而這一時刻很快就會到來。
本文發表於2014年3月6日《華盛頓郵報》
Public discussion on Ukraine is all about confrontation. But do we know where we are going? In my life, I have seen four wars begun with great enthusiasm and public support, all of which we did not know how to end and from three of which we withdrew unilaterally. The test of policy is how it ends, not how it begins.
Far too often the Ukrainian issue is posed as a showdown: whether Ukraine joins the East or the West. But if Ukraine is to survive and thrive, it must not be either side’s outpost against the other — it should function as a bridge between them.
Russia must accept that to try to force Ukraine into a satellite status, and thereby move Russia’s borders again, would doom Moscow to repeat its history of self-fulfilling cycles of reciprocal pressures with Europe and the United States.
The West must understand that, to Russia,Ukraine can never be just a foreign country. Russian history began in what was called Kievan-Rus. The Russian religion spread from there. Ukraine has been part of Russia for centuries, and their histories were intertwined before then. Some of the most important battles for Russian freedom, starting with the Battle of Poltava in 1709 , were fought on Ukrainian soil. The Black Sea Fleet— Russia’s means of projecting power in the Mediterranean — is based by long-term lease in Sevastopol, in Crimea. Even such famed dissidents as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Joseph Brodsky insisted that Ukraine was an integral part of Russian history and, indeed, of Russia.
The European Union must recognize that its bureaucratic dilatoriness and subordination of the strategic element to domestic politics in negotiating Ukraine’s relationship to Europe contributed to turning a negotiation into a crisis. Foreign policy is the art of establishing priorities.
The Ukrainians are the decisive element.They live in a country with a complex history and a polyglot composition. The Western part was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939, when Stalin and Hitler divided up the spoils. Crimea, 60 percent of whose population is Russian, became part of Ukraine only in 1954 , when Nikita Khrushchev, a Ukrainian by birth, awarded it as part of the 300th-year celebration of a Russian agreement with the Cossacks. The west is largely Catholic; the east largely Russian Orthodox. The west speaks Ukrainian; the east speaks mostly Russian. Any attempt by one wing of Ukraine to dominate the other — as has been the pattern — would lead eventually to civil war or breakup. To treat Ukraineas part of an East-West confrontation would scuttle for decades any prospect to bring Russia and the West — especially Russia and Europe — into a cooperative international system.
Ukraine has been independent for only 23years; it had previously been under some kind of foreign rule since the 14th century. Not surprisingly, its leaders have not learned the art of compromise,even less of historical perspective. The politics of post-independence Ukraine clearly demonstrate that the root of the problem lies in efforts by Ukrainian politicians to impose their will on recalcitrant parts of the country, first by one faction, then by the other. That is the essence of the conflict between Viktor Yanukovych and his principal political rival, Yulia Tymoshenko. They represent the two wings of Ukraine and have not been willing to share power. Awise U.S. policy toward Ukraine would seek a way for the two parts of the country to cooperate with each other. We should seek reconciliation, not the dominationof a faction.
Russia and the West, and least of all the various factions in Ukraine, have not acted on this principle. Each has made the situation worse. Russia would not be able to impose a military solution without isolating itself at a time when many of its borders are already precarious. For the West, the demonization of Vladimir Putin is not a policy;it is an alibi for the absence of one.
Putin should come to realize that,whatever his grievances, a policy of military impositions would produce another Cold War. For its part, the United States needs to avoid treating Russia as an aberrant to be patiently taught rules of conduct established by Washington.Putin is a serious strategist — on the premises of Russian history. Understanding U.S. values and psychology are not his strong suits. Nor has understanding Russian history and psychology been a strong point of U.S. policymakers.
Leaders of all sides should return to examining outcomes, not compete in posturing. Here is my notion of an outcome compatible with the values and security interests of all sides:
1. Ukraine should have the right to choose freely its economic and political associations, including with Europe.
2. Ukraine should not join NATO, a position I took seven years ago, when it last came up.
3. Ukraine should be free to create any government compatible with the expressed will of its people. Wise Ukrainian leaders would then opt for a policy of reconciliation between the various parts of their country. Internationally, they should pursue a posture comparable to that of Finland. That nation leaves no doubt about its fierce independence and cooperates with the West in most fields but carefully avoids institutional hostility toward Russia.
4. It is incompatible with the rules ofthe existing world order for Russia to annex Crimea. But it should be possibleto put Crimea’s relationship to Ukraine on a less fraught basis. To that end, Russia would recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea. Ukraine should reinforce Crimea’s autonomy in elections held in the presence of international observers. The process would include removing any ambiguities about the status of the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol.
These are principles, not prescriptions. People familiar with the region will know that not all of them will be palatable to all parties. The test is not absolute satisfaction but balanced dissatisfaction. If some solution based on these or comparable elements is not achieved, the drift toward confrontation will accelerate. The time for thatwill come soon enough.
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Henry A. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977.
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